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1. Introduction 
 
The recent years have once again brought the issue of integration to the top of the 
agenda in politics as well as in the wider public discourse in Germany and other 
European countries. It has been triggered by multiple factors – firstly, the new wave of 
mass immigration of asylum seekers coming from war-torn countries of the Middle East 
and Northern Africa and the continuous problems with integration of migrants coming 
to the surface. Secondly, a growing social gap and lack of equal opportunity for young 
people with migrant background as well as the increasing radicalization on young 
Muslims especially in the urban regions of West Germany. The recent terrorist attacks 
in Paris and Brussels, as well as several barely prevented attempted attacks on Germany 
itself, add to the notion of an integration failure in Europe’s diverse societies. All this 
has brought back the issue of integration and resulted in a renewed debate over 
Germany’s identity as an immigrant country with politicians questioning previous state 
practices and making strong statements such as Angela Merkel saying that 
“multiculturalism has failed, utterly failed” (Der Spiegel 2010b).  
 
Against the backdrop of current discussions, this thesis aims to make two contributions. 
Firstly, on a conceptual level, I will be discussing multiculturalist vs. assimilationist 
approaches towards immigrant integration and thereby developing an analytical 
framework for a study on different state approaches towards immigrant integration. 
Secondly, empirically, in order to apply this analytical framework on my case-study of 
Germany, I am going to discuss the political changes that have taken place starting from 
the Kohl government in the 1980s. By looking back in time, I will provide insights into 
the broader and more recent questions regarding Germany’s political and institutional 
readiness to tackle the influx of new people and problems arising in this process. I will 
provide a process-tracing analysis that will give an overview of the events that took 
place as well as their possible causal links and outcomes in terms of what change they 
introduced as well as which debates they, in turn, brought up. By analyzing the 
developments so far, I aim to locate Germany’s policies vis a vis its immigrant 
communities over time on my developed ideal-typical continuum of different 
approaches towards immigrant integration and determine shifts that have taken place on 
the scale.  
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The analysis, which will start after a brief overview of migration waves starting from 
the guest-workers coming in in the 1950s, will focus on the period that stretches from 
the early 1980s all to the way to the present, dividing it into two main phases. For the 
discussion of the first phase that starts with the center-right Kohl government in 1982, a 
brief genealogy of postwar immigration to Germany will be given, starting from the 
recruitment of first guest-workers in the 1950s. Yet priority is given to analyzing policy 
developments and choices under the extended government of Helmut Kohl (CDU1). 
This first period, which I will term as the politics of denial, ends with the 1998 elections 
after which the SPD-Green2 government took office and introduced new policies in the 
areas of citizenship legislation and integration. The SPD-Green government was 
replaced by Chancellor Angela Merkel’s first cabinet in 2005, when the Grand Coalition 
of CDU/CSU-SPD was formed for the first time. Between 2009 and 2013, CDU/CSU 
was in government with the FDP3, after which the Grand Coalition returned by forming 
Merkel’s third cabinet. This is where my analysis will also end, as I deliberately aim to 
leave out the current debate in my analysis, since it mainly concerns asylum seekers, 
who are not conceptually in the main focus of this thesis (reasoning for that explained 
below) and since I argue, that the debate has opened a whole new phase in the 
immigration and integration discourse and is simply yet too fresh and beyond the scope 
of this thesis. 
 
I will be taking a top-down approach and look at different state policy developments 
regarding citizenship and naturalization legislation, the legislation concerning aliens 
(Ausländergesetzgebung) and the accompanying integration measures like those 
regarding education policies. This means that the analysis of legal changes concerns 
citizenship issues on the one hand and social policy issues on the other hand. The role of 
citizenship for integration will be elaborated on in the theoretical section. Social policy 
issues, however, have a larger impact on the every-day and personal life of people with 
migration background, who don’t have citizenship, as it regulates their possibilities, for 
instance, to bring over families or to benefit from the welfare state. Therefore, it is 
important to take into account. The top-down in this regard means that I will be 
                                                          
1 The Christian Democratic Union of Germany. Referred to as CDU/CSU on the federal level due to the 
joint action with the Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CSU). 
2 The Social Democratic Party of Germany and Alliance ’90/The Greens. 
3 The Free Democratic Party. 
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focusing solely on the state action and not particularly on how the migrant groups 
respond to these changes. However, in the last part of the analysis, I will pay particular 
attention to issues of minority organization and participation which, in part, may be a 
consequence of the legal changes. I will thus look at various bodies and conferences of 
minority representation such as the Conference on Islam and the Integration Summit, 
that have been convened and operate in close proximity to government officials on the 
federal level. In fact, the existence of a body of representative organizations that 
regularly consult with government officials is a relatively new phenomenon in German 
politics which is characteristic for the later phase, which I will term the politics of 
acceptance, in the history of immigrant integration in Germany. Initiated during the 
SPD-Green government and further developed under Merkel, the focus seems to have 
moved from mere legislation to more state-level proactive measures. The focus of my 
analysis will then move to evaluating the extent to which these efforts have had an 
impact in reality.  
 
Before starting the theoretical discussion on different modes of immigrant integration in 
liberal democracies, a short remark on the issue of immigrant categories is in place in 
order to sharpen the analytical focus of this study. Roughly speaking, migrants can be 
divided into three categories. The first group are migrants with citizenship, who gain it 
automatically due to state legislation, based on bloodlines (ius sanguinis), like for 
example Jews in Israel, or on a particular colonial legacy, like for instance in France. 
These people have citizenship right away, but they are still considered as people with 
migration background and require integration. The second group are foreigners in the 
sense that they don’t have the citizenship of their host country, but have acquired 
residence permits and live in the country for extended periods (or even their whole 
lives) and often have their children born in the country. In most countries, they also 
have the option to naturalize or become eligible for it at some point. They are also 
taxpayers and therefore eligible for some state benefits, but nevertheless don’t have the 
same legal status as citizens, even though the extent to which they are able to get state 
benefits varies from country to country. The third group are asylum seekers, who 
become refugees, once the receiving country grants them the right of asylum. These 
people fall under the international obligation to help people whose life at home is not 
safe and therefore differ from economic migrants, who move in hope to find better 
living standards in another country. Asylum seekers and even refugees are extremely 
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restricted in their eligibility for social benefits, but also in their possibilities to 
participate in the labor market and to pay taxes. Therefore, even though the question of 
asylum seekers is often a trigger for wider political debates on immigration and 
integration, they are fundamentally a different category from economic migrants. It is 
clear that, over time, migrants have the possibility to move from one of these three 
categories to another, and it is also clear that many state policies of integration may 
target all three of those groups. The latter is to be seen especially in the so-called soft 
policy areas such as education. However, for the context of this thesis, it is important to 
analytically differentiate between these groups, because fundamentally, the state takes a 
different approach towards them. The ones most affected by the approach that the state 
takes regarding immigrant integration, is the second group – migrants without 
citizenship – which is who this analysis is particularly interested in.  
 
After completing a process-tracing analysis based on a developed analytical framework 
and the clear distinction of migrant groups affected, I will, in the end, return to the 
broader questions of Germany’s position and readiness at the doorstep of yet another 
phase in the country’s history of dealing with immigration and integration, which we 
are still witnessing today. By doing that, I aim to make a more general contribution of 
providing insights and background for the current developments and processes that 
itself do not yet fit into the scope this analysis.   
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2. Theoretical background 
 
Approaches to immigrant integration 
 
Policy approaches regarding immigrant integration, from a theoretical perspective, are 
usually described through a continuum, where on one end are multicultural approaches 
and on the other end are strongly assimilationist approaches. This following section 
aims to explain these concepts in order to provide theoretical background and better 
understanding for the empirical part of the thesis later on. It is important to note that this 
theoretical distinction in itself is rather ideal-typical. Thus, in reality, there are no cases 
that stand on the extreme ends of the continuum. This however does not reduce the 
usefulness of this framework for analyzing different cases as it provides measurement 
and helps us determine and pinpoint shifts in policy approaches.  
 
As a term, multiculturalism can be used for describing different phenomena. It can 
simply be understood as a description of an ethnically or culturally diverse society. Will 
Kymlicka (1995, 10-11), being one of the earliest and leading authors on the topic, 
divides the origins of this diversity in countries into two: multination states and 
polyethnic states. In multination states, cultural diversity arises from historical 
minorities that have been incorporated into one state. Polyethnic states, on the contrary, 
are created through immigration. The latter is the kind of diversity this thesis will be 
focusing on, regarding the case of Germany. However, in the context of this thesis, the 
term multiculturalism should not refer to merely the diversity in the society, but should 
instead be understood as a policy approach towards immigrant integration that 
strategically aims for diversity preservation. The central assumption behind 
multicultural rights and policies is that the recognition of cultural differences and 
fostering special rights based on these differences, as well as preventing cultural 
discrimination, are effective means for achieving integration and avoiding exclusion in a 
society. Tariq Modood (2007, 61), who extends the concept from ethnic minorities to 
religious groups as well and therefore emphasizes the recognition of difference in 
general, for instance, defines political multiculturalism as “an accommodative form of 
integration which would allow group-based racialized, ethnic, cultural, religious 
identities and practices to be recognized and supported in the public space, rather than 
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require them to be privatized.” With that, Modood explains multicultural policies as an 
attempt to turn negative difference of groups into positive. Diverse societies can be 
endangered by threats arising from a weak or nonexistent strategy to tackle the needs of 
such a society. Parekh (2000, 196) for instance, goes as far as claiming that the deeper 
the diversity in the society, the greater the unity and common belonging it needs. 
Therefore, unity and cohesion do not necessarily presuppose homogeneity. On a more 
specific policy level, multiculturalist goals can be achieved, for example, by allowing 
and funding mother-tongue teaching for immigrant children, allowing the practicing of 
different religions as well as habits/traditions based on that, fostering minority 
representation, supporting media in minority languages or even affirmative action etc. 
The most common examples of countries that have adopted multicultural policies 
towards immigrant integration have been Canada, the Netherlands. However, even in 
those countries, migrants are expected to learn the language, which proves the earlier 
notion about the ideal-typical character of the two ends on this theoretical continuum. 
 
On the opposite end of the conceptual continuum introduced earlier, we find strongly 
assimilationist approach. According to Parekh (2000, 196-197), this assimilation is 
based on the conviction that common national culture, values beliefs and practices are 
the sole way for a stable and cohesive polity, making the nation state an ideal. 
Therefore, if a minority member wants to be treated equally, they need to assimilate. 
Assimilation by definition would mean becoming the same or similar, as in culturally 
indistinguishable in a fully homogenous society. In the context of immigrant 
integration, this process takes place in one direction only, meaning the assimilationist 
view therefore supports the immigrants’ absorption by the host society’s culture. The 
emphasis here is on the migrant actually giving up their ethnic and/or cultural identity in 
favor of the host society’s. Although a complete assimilation is sometimes considered 
utopian (Yanasmayan 2011, 24), there are examples that might prove that it’s actually 
possible, such as the so-called melting pot of the USA – giving up one’s ethnic or 
cultural differences might not fully happen within one generation, but is entirely 
possible over the course of multiple generations. However, according to Brubaker 
(2001, 534), assimilation in its general, abstract meaning is indeed a matter of degree, 
where the emphasis is on the process rather than a desired end state. Therefore, 
analytically, it is worth speaking of assimilationist policies, even though they might not 
have assimilationist outcomes. Both Brubaker (Ibid.) and Parekh (2000, 197) emphasize 
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the importance of drawing a line between voluntary and forced assimilation, the latter of 
which is, firstly, morally objectionable in democratic societies and can, secondly, have 
the opposite effect. As defined by Castles and Davidson (2000, 60), assimilation, on a 
policy level, is pursued through language learning encouragement and/or requirements 
specifically as well as expecting immigrants to adjust themselves to the social and 
cultural practices of the host society in general. I argue that this, however, does not fully 
grasp the idea – language learning, for instance, can also happen in a society with 
multiculturalist policies and does not mean assimilation right away. As noted earlier, 
assimilation specifically expects giving up the aspects in in one’s identity that make 
them differ from the host society. Therefore, not only learning the language, but also 
using it with their children, who then in turn already grow up to be less different 
identity-wise. Assimilationist policies also mean that the state makes no difference 
based on ethnicity, religion, language or culture and discourages individuals to practice 
their culture in the public sphere. This differentiation between the public and the private 
sphere, to which the state cannot intervene, is crucial for the definition of positive 
assimilation. Thus, states on the more assimilationist side of the continuum, see that by 
discouraging cultural differences and promoting assimilation in the public sphere, such 
as through education in school environment by implementing a streamlined system that 
all immigrants have to go through as well, it helps migrants to succeed in the society. In 
practice, this policy can indeed increase the migrants’ chances on, for instance, the job 
market. In this sense, assimilation is achieved in a positive way (as opposed to forced 
assimilation and the violation of human rights) through the state not giving incentives 
for celebrating difference, but considering it a private matter instead which is not 
supported from outside. A commonly used country example for assimilationist policies 
is France and its policies regarding migrants, starting from the ones arriving from 
former colonies in the post-war decades.  
 
States’ positions on this continuum are, of course, constantly changing. Many European 
immigration countries, for instance, have recently been discussed (ie. Koopmans 2010) 
in the context of a possible retreat from multiculturalist policies. Position shifts between 
the multiculturalist and assimilationist extremes, that can come about as a result of 
economic needs, change of government, external shocks (such as an emerging threat or 
a war in another country) or some other factor, can and have been taking place in both 
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directions. Therefore, with the analysis in this thesis, I aim at pinpointing Germany’s 
positions on this scale over time and discuss, which events caused the changes and why.  
 
The role of citizenship in the context of integration 
 
Since I will be looking at the shifts in German citizenship legislation in my analysis, it 
is worth discussing the meaning of citizenship in the theoretical context of integration 
separately as well. As already mentioned in the introduction, citizenship as a state 
instrument already makes a difference between migrant groups. Whereas some groups 
in some countries gain citizenship right away (based on ius sanguinis or colonial legacy, 
for instance), others are denied it and stay in the country as migrants with permitted 
residence only. The second group, however, depending on the country’s law, can 
become eligible for naturalization at some point after having legally lived in the country 
for a certain number of years or after completing some other requirement. Thus they 
become citizens eventually, but still not right away. An example of the former situation 
where migrants gain citizenship right away is France with many immigrants from 
former colonies, such as Moroccans, who have French citizenship. Many of them are 
still not very well integrated in the society, despite the equal legal status to the ethnic 
French. An example for the latter case is the Netherlands, where we find many 
foreigners from Southeast Asia or other parts of the world, for whom naturalization is 
not an option for various reasons. The country has taken a clear multiculturalist 
approach by not granting citizenship to migrants (including people from the 
Netherlands’ former colonies), yet most of the migrants are still well integrated, 
especially in economic terms. Thus, even though citizenship is often considered the 
highest level of integration or being accepted as part of society, legally, citizenship 
alone is often not enough to guarantee full social integration. 
 
To address this issue, Soysal (1994, 8) conceptually divides the meanings of citizenship 
into two – a part of national identity vs. a guarantee for certain rights – and sees a 
certain disparity between the two. The phenomena of rights becoming more and more 
personal has brought about a new understanding of membership that is much less tied to 
the person’s national, ethnic or regional ties than citizenship, but on universal principles 
instead. It is what she calls a postnational model where entitlements are legitimized on 
the basis of personhood and where citizenship allows rights regardless of ethnic, 
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cultural or religious ties. In most countries today, what differentiates people with 
citizenship from those without is the right to participate in the country’s democratic 
procedures such as voting or running for a representative body, whereas, as Soysal 
(Ibid., 30) notes, other rights and privileges that were initially only accorded to citizens, 
have been made available for resident migrants as well. The latter including becoming a 
beneficiary of the state’s welfare system, participating in housing and labor markets, 
being involved in business and increasingly even taking part in the political sphere of 
the country through other means, since voting (except on a local level in some places) 
has still remained a citizen right. Therefore, we might ask if the rights that come with 
citizenship and thus citizenship itself have become rather symbolic than actually 
affecting the migrants’ everyday life. Being officially accepted (granted citizenship) by 
the state does not necessarily mean being accepted by the society as a whole and might 
therefore not be the most important goal from the migrant’s perspective.  
 
Thus, a shift in citizenship legislation only might not constitute such a dividing 
watershed event as it is sometimes discussed, unless it is accompanied by more 
effective integration measures. The understanding behind citizenship as an institution is 
in some regard a much more important aspect in terms of actual change in state 
approaches. The meaning of citizenship itself reflects on the meaning of a change in 
citizenship legislation. Regarding the different groups of migrants discussed earlier, 
citizenship as a status is a proof of different things, which also varies country by 
country. Becoming a citizen as a person with a migration background might simply 
mean being born in the country (or its former colony) or having a special legal status 
due to one’s ethnic background (for example the children of ethnic Germans in Russia 
who grew up there, but are entitled to citizenship thanks to their heritage), but might 
also mark an end point of a longer path where the migrant has lived in the country for 
some time and become a naturalized citizen. In the first two cases, citizenship as such 
can hardly be associated with integration. In the third case regarding the group of 
migrants, with whom this thesis is mainly concerned with, however, the connectedness 
to actual integration, seems logically much higher.  
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3. Empirics: tracing policy developments 
 
The aim of this empirical section of the thesis is to trace the policy development and 
political struggles over citizenship and integration legislation over time and to discuss 
the major political and discursive shifts the German political elite has gone through 
since the arrival of the first guest-workers in the 1950s. Two key phases in the 
development of German integration policy will be identified, the first roughly stretching 
from 1982 to 1998 (thus covering the entire Kohl era), the second starting with the 
change of government in 1998 and ending with the end of the second Merkel 
government in 2013.  
 
Yet before tracing policy developments and political debates in each of these phases, a 
brief review of the state of postwar immigration to Germany is at place, thus providing 
a basic demographic backdrop to the analysis.  
 
From guest-workers to Spätaussiedler: immigration waves since 1950 
 
The situation in Germany regarding migrants today is a result of decades of immigration 
that often happened in big waves and by specific groups. Arguably the biggest reason 
behind Germany’s large population share with a migrant background has come about as 
a result of the guest-worker programs that started off in the 1950s to keep up with the 
needs of the labor market during the economic boom (Wirtschaftswunder) while the 
country’s own population was aging and the official working hours were reduced. 
Bilateral agreements were made to bring in temporary work force for mainly the 
industrial sector that did not require high qualifications. This included a list of countries 
– Italy 1955, Spain 1960, Greece 1960, Turkey 1961, Portugal 1964, Tunisia 1965 and 
Yugoslavia 1968. The policy, that included the recruitment of some 2.6 million 
foreigners (Oezcan 2004), ended up influencing the profile of the migrant community in 
West-Germany in the next decades. Recruitment went on until the halt in 1973, tables 1 
and 2 aim to provide some statistical data to show and illustrate the impact of the guest-
worker program.  
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 1961 1970 1975 
Population size 
(thousand) 
56 174,8 60 650,6 61 644,6 
Foreign population 
size (thousand) 
686,2 2600,6 3900,5 
Share of foreigners  1,22% 4,29% 6,33% 
Table 1: the relative share of immigrants in the overall population. (Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2016, 26-27) 
 
 1960 1973 
Foreigners among 
economically active 
population 
 
1,3% 
 
11,9% 
Number of economically 
active people in the country 
26,3 Mil. 27,7 Mil. 
Labor force participation 
rate4 
47,7% 44,3% 
Table 2: the change on the labor market as a result of the guest-worker program. (BMI 
2014, 14-15) 
 
Even though the Turkish minority has become a significant community of people with 
migrant background by now, the statistics in the beginning showed something else. 
Until the late 1960s, Italy, Spain and Greece were the most strongly represented 
countries of immigration. In the following years, though, the share of workers from the 
former Yugoslavia and Turkey started growing faster. By 1973, therefore, the Turks 
made up the biggest share of 23% among the all foreigners in the country (BMI 2014, 
14-15).  
 
The agreements were originally meant as one to two year contracts, after which the 
workers were expected to leave. However, the reality proved to be different, especially 
after the recruitment halt of 1973, which, for many workers, meant that it was no longer 
possible to return home only temporarily. Faced with the decision, many of the workers 
thus decided to not only stay (some had the right for free movement as citizens of the 
European Community whereas some had simply acquired residence permits), but also 
                                                          
4 The number of economically active and unemployed people among the whole population. By showing 
available workers in the society, it reflects the society’s characteristics. 
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bring over families. Therefore, the 1973 halt did not reduce the total share of foreigners 
in the country. However, the number plateaued at between 7-7,5% with some 
fluctuation until late 1980s whereas the population size itself stood slightly above 61 
million. The women to men ratio has however been growing ever since the start of the 
program, after the recruitment halt and up until today. (Statistisches Bundesamt 2016, 
26-27) The growth in the women to men ratio is an indicator that shows that whereas 
some men returned home, many stayed and brought over their families as well as later 
on had children, who did not gain German citizenship and therefore became a part of the 
foreign population. Therefore, in the theoretical context of this thesis, thanks to the 
guest-worker program in the 1950-1970s and the following family unification, the 
absolute share of immigrants without citizenship in the overall population of Germany 
has immensely grown and made the need for integration ever more apparent.  
 
Concerning the other big group of migrants – the ones with citizenship – Germany also 
experienced immigration mainly from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Through 
that, between the 1950 and the late 1980s over 1,5 million so called Aussiedler, people 
of German ethnic origin mostly from Central Europe and Romania, came to live in West 
Germany. In the late 1980s with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this number rose 
significantly to over three million, with almost all ethnic German migrants now arriving 
from the former Soviet Union areas (Worbs et al. 2013, 28-30) (see table 3 below). 
After 1993 they were officially depicted as Spätaussiedler, as their profile had 
completely changed from what it had been in the past decades. Based on the citizenship 
law in Germany at the time, they and their families received automatic citizenship upon 
proving German ethnic roots. Even though the main focus of this thesis is on migrants 
without citizenship expecting that they are first and foremost the groups that need 
integrating, the Aussiedler and even more the Spätaussiedler are also often affected by 
the integration-related policies that I will be looking at due to the characteristics of the 
specific migrant group they form. Table 3 illustrates the influx of (Spät-)Aussiedler 
during the period of the first phase of this analysis.  
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Table 3: the influx of (Spät-)Aussiedler to Germany from 1950 to 2000 in thousands per 
year. (Worbs et al. 2013, 31-32) 
 
As can be seen from the statistics, the influx of ethnic German immigrants became 
significant only with the breakdown of the Iron Curtain – during the decade from 1990 
to 2000, more people were accepted as repatriates in Germany (2 124 791) than in the 
almost four previous decades since 1950 (1 999 691) (Ibid., 28-29). Having lived and/or 
grown up outside of Germany (and having often been subjected to Soviet repressive 
policies), many of them had lost most linguistic and cultural ties to Germany. This loss 
of cultural ties and the fact that the arrival took place in a big wave in the early 1990s 
meant that despite their legally equal status in the society, in reality the integration of 
these people into the German society was rather complicated. Moreover, unlike the 
guest-workers in the 1950-1970s, the Aussiedler rarely had a workplace waiting for 
them upon arrival which made economic integration more complicated as well. 
 
As already mentioned, even though asylum seekers and refugees actually fall under a 
completely different legal category when speaking of immigration and integration, they 
are often high on the public discourse agenda and trigger debates and changes that affect 
the more relevant groups for this topic. Therefore, table 4 shows the statistics of the 
influx of asylum seekers from 1955 to 1998 where we can see a smaller but significant 
wave in 1980, after the 1973 recruitment halt, when a lot of Turkish asylum seekers 
0
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came in, and a bigger wave in the early nineties when in 1992 the yearly influx of 
asylum seekers reached an all time high of almost 440 000 (BAMF 2015, 11; BMI 
2014, 17-18).  
 
 
Table 4: the number of asylum seeking applications in thousands between 1955 and 
1998. (BAMF 2015, 11) 
 
3.1. Phase one: Kohl’s politics of denial (1982-1998) 
 
The Christian Democratic (CDU/CSU5) government under chancellor Helmut Kohl that 
ruled with changing coalitions from 1982 to 1998 largely denied the need for more 
targeted integration policies with the infamous notion of “Deutschland ist kein 
Einwanderungsland” (“Germany is not a country of immigration”) being used over and 
over again in official statements (Winter 2010, 170). This position was actually not new 
compared to Kohl’s predecessors (Williams 2011, 57). The official policies under Kohl 
still followed the assumption that the immigrant guest-workers, who entered the country 
with the contracts made with Southern European countries during the 1950s and 1960s 
and who made up the majority of foreigners in the country, were going to return home 
at some point, even though the reality proved to be much different and many of them 
                                                          
5 Referred to as CDU/CSU on the federal level due to the joint action with the Christian Social Union of 
Bavaria (CSU). 
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ended up staying as shown earlier, forming a large migrant community. Comprehensive 
policy developments regarding these processes were stagnating over a long period of 
non-decision-making leading many analysts to talk about deliberate political neglect. 
On the one hand, the fact that no formal integration policy structures, normally 
characteristic to immigration countries, were put in place was justified by the political 
standpoint that Germany was not seeking new permanent immigration (Green 2004, 6). 
This however was completely looking past the reality of the continuing dependant 
migration (the families seeking to reunite with their family members already in 
Germany) and the permanently staying immigrant workers even after the recruitment 
halt of 1973. On the other hand, multiple authors (Winter 2010, 170-171; Hailbronner, 
Faharat 2015, 2-3) have made the claim that the reason behind the strong neglect of any 
multiculturalism in Germany was the the debate on nationality in Germany prior to 
1990, which was largely focused on the goal of reuniting Germany. With that goal in 
mind, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRD) based their insistence on a common 
German nationality on the 1913 Reichs- and Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (Nationality 
Law), claiming that there was only one inseparable German nation and emphasizing the 
image of a divided nation with only one legitimate representative, the FRD. 
 
A clear more practical demonstration of the government’s denial of Germany being an 
immigration country was the long process of reforming the 1965 Ausländergesetz 
(Aliens Act) that rose to the agenda already in the first half of the 1980s. In 1988 a draft 
for the reform leaked first to the social welfare organization Arbeiterwohlfahrt and on to 
the wider public through the magazine Der Spiegel. This, especially the second part of 
the draft, a proposal for an Ausländeraufnahmegesetz (Foreigners’ Entry Law), revealed 
CDU’s positions on the issue. The Entry Law aimed to introduce a range of restrictive 
measures regarding residence permits (making unlimited residency an exception, not a 
rule, and limiting the time limited residence permits could be extended) and children 
following their migrant parents to prevent any further immigration to West Germany 
(Green 2004, 60-61). The message was a clear statement that Germany was not seen as 
an immigration country and a more defensive and restrictive position had been taken by 
the government. In the following years over fierce debates between the government and 
the opposition, some amendments to the draft were made and in 1990, in a very heated 
process, it was finally pushed through with a very majoritarian and rushed approach 
taken by the CDU/CSU government to ensure its passing (Ibid., 68-72).  
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The eventually passed version of the Aliens Act received heavy criticism from the 
Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Greens on the opposition side. However, it did 
bring some ease for immigrants in Germany. Simplified naturalization “as a rule” was 
introduced for foreigners with over 15 years of residence and foreigners aged 16-23 
with over 8 years of residence and 6 years of attendance in German schools. The 
naturalization process depended on the person giving up their former citizenship, but in 
general, eased the access to German citizenship and the rights that came with it. Also, 
exceptions were made regarding the renunciation of previous citizenship rule, which 
made it possible for a number of people to still gain dual citizenship (Howard 2004, 4). 
This introduction of limited naturalization policies officially acknowledged long-term 
immigrants as a fact and can be considered as the first time Germany passed citizenship 
regulations normally common to traditional immigrant countries (Green 2004, 79; 
Borkert, Bosswick 2011, 99). 
 
For a while, the thematic regarding legislation on immigrants got pushed out of the 
center of attention by the euphoria following the reunification on October 3, 1990 and 
seemed to have no significant effect on the first Bundestag election in December. 
However, it was quickly brought back to the top of the agenda as mass immigration 
skyrocketed as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as Yugoslavia 
disintegrating. These events caused the influx of several migrant groups in big waves 
(see tables 3 and 4 earlier) – the Aussiedler and Spätaussiedler as well as Jews from the 
former Soviet Union and refugees escaping the ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia. 
The latter – more than 345 000 Bosnian refugees (as well as smaller amounts from other 
Balkan countries) – largely came in until the Dayton Agreement of 1995 that ended the 
Bosnian war (BMI 2014, 19). Jews gained a special legal status in 1991 when Germany 
officially started accepting the immigration of Jewish people and their families from the 
former Soviet Union – through that, over a 100 000 people had entered the country by 
1998 (almost 200 000 by 2004 when the statistics in that regard dropped) (Ibid., 146). 
However, throughout the 1990s, the political discussion was more concerned with a 
general dispute over national identity than actual rational policy solution finding (Green 
2004, 83-84). The early 1990s in the newly unified Germany were characterized by a 
series of decisions and policies in reaction to the fear of massive movement after the fall 
of the Iron Curtain. Restrictive amendments to the Foreigners Law were made. Treibel 
(2001, 115) describes this as the state’s message to the population with a migrant 
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background as well as potential immigrants about its restrictive, controlling and 
skeptical approach. Borkert and Bosswick (2011, 106) state that the more liberal aspects 
in those amendments like the simplified naturalization process under certain conditions 
were less known to the public and therefore the common message remained in a 
restrictive light.  
 
As for mechanisms existing already from before, there were charity institutions 
(Wohlfahrtsverbände) that worked on the social integration of resident labor migrants 
and the second generation by offering various services like community-related social 
work, counselling services, health care, support for transitioning onto the labor market, 
language acquisition as well as support for adolescent criminal offenders on probation 
(Borkert, Bosswick 2011, 108). What may have left those efforts less noticed and 
ignored by the political discourse, though, was the fact that these services were often 
not directly aimed at migrants, but at wider socially disadvantaged groups, including 
citizens.  
 
In 1992 in light of the mass influx of asylum seekers causing the extreme-right parties 
to rise to the surface and the first anti-foreigner violence acts happening in various 
places in Germany, the negotiations with the CDU/CSU and the FDP on one side and 
the SPD on the other side (leaving out the Greens who opposed to the asylum 
amendment) reached an agreement as part of the so-called Asylkompromiss (asylum-
compromise). This combination of policies restricted the asylum-seekers’ influx on one 
side, but limited and restricted the regulations on ethnic German immigration, extended 
the simplified naturalization process as well as lowered the cost of normal 
naturalizations on the other side (Green 2004, 84-87). As mentioned earlier, sometimes 
the same policies can target legally different groups in an overlapping manner. This, 
however, was an interesting example of different groups being included in the same 
policy package as weights to achieve a compromise between opposing political parties. 
Therefore, some authors, such as Bade and Oltmer (2004) have noted that the title 
Asylkompromiss is rather misguiding since it was more of a general migration 
compromise.  
 
These issues – naturalization, citizenship and dual citizenship questions were mainly 
kept up by the opposition during the early 1990s. Whereas the SPD brought it to the 
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asylum compromise in 1992, the Greens were petitioning for the legalization of dual 
citizenship which was then introduced to the Bundestag and the Bundesrat by the SPD, 
but got rejected by the CDU/CSU government in 1994 (Green 2004, 90). 
 
As an interesting phenomenon from the integration perspective, Germany was the first 
country to introduce language tests in the country of origin as a precondition for 
immigration in 1997. This was meant to tackle the enormous influx of the ethnic 
German immigrants. However, the aim of the language tests was not as much to 
facilitate integration, but to require proof of actual German belonging by showing 
language skills in a specific dialect that’s characteristic to ethnic Germans having lived 
outside Germany for generations (Michalowski 2010, 185). Nevertheless, this is a sign 
of the government starting to respond to the changed profile of the Spätaussiedler that, 
in reality, was no longer as much in coherence with the idea behind the German national 
identity and its reflection in the citizenship policy that had long been granting 
citizenship to ethnic Germans without any other requirements besides proven German 
descent.  
 
Looking back, multiple explanations can be assigned as reasons behind the fact that it 
was possible to not only deny the need to integrate immigrants for so long, but also 
deny a status or a national identity of an immigration country in general. As already said 
earlier, a strong but somewhat passive in the sense that it was not so openly brought up 
was the argument made by authors such as Winter (2010, 170-171) of one nation in the 
context of a divided Germany which could not have been dropped until the unification 
took place. The CDU under Chancellor Kohl kept a rather consistent line in that matter, 
even though being constantly opposed with pressures from the SPD and the Greens in 
the opposition, demanding for more liberal and open policies. This growing sense of 
opposition on the federal level was however also a reason in itself why legislation 
reforms kept on being unsuccessful. The complicated negotiation processes and the time 
consuming nature of these changes (some required even changing the Basic Law), 
especially in a very fragmented political organization such as the one in Germany, made 
it hard to keep up with the real-time developments in and around the country, especially 
with migrant groups arriving in big waves and in turn causing fast developments on the 
inner discourse level that sometimes escalated in acts of violence or protests.  
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In relation to the theories of immigrant integrating, then, in a way, one could argue that 
Germany completely falls out of this scale during the phase of denial as the state did not 
do anything to facilitate integration neither through assimilation or through 
multicultural policies. Nevertheless, I would still place Germany on the assimilationist 
side of the continuum during the first phase of this thesis for two main reasons. Firstly, 
acquiring citizenship through naturalization had been made extremely hard for migrants 
of non-German ethnic background through, for instance, long residence requirements. 
In reality, this meant that the migrant had to be culturally completely assimilated in 
order to become a German citizen. Secondly, even though a growing group of foreign 
migrants existed in the country (and moreover, the guest-workers came in as a part of a 
state policy of recruitment from abroad), the official standpoint did not recognize them 
as a minority or as a part of a multicultural society. Rights regarding their 
ethnic/cultural/religious differences from Germans were not recognized or supported 
and kept fully a private matter where the state did not intervene. This is similar to 
practices in the precedent case of France, where the state deliberately does not engage in 
any kind of specifically targeted policies towards various migrant ethnic groups living 
in the country. Therefore, by not pursuing any multiculturalist policies – expressed both 
in forcing migrants to go through the German system as well as the restrictive 
citizenship policy – in effect, creates a strong indirect assimilation pressure.  
 
However, while the issue of reunification was now past, pressures from outside of the 
government for more action regarding immigrant integration as well as the realization 
within the political sphere of the need to take a more active stance, were growing. The 
CDU/CSU, in the meanwhile, remained on a conservative position, which is why these 
pressures were growing without any result until the change of government in 1998.  
 
3.2. Phase two: from acceptance to Gestaltung6 (1998-2013) 
 
The federal elections on September 27, 1998 ended chancellor Helmut Kohl’s long 
chancellorship of 16 years and brought about a complete change in government with the 
SPD-Green now forming a coalition under the leadership of Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder. This was a big step forward from a long period of non-decision making that 
                                                          
6 The German word Gestaltung is here used to express the process of actually shaping integration. 
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had lasted throughout the 1990s due to conflicting positions between the CDU/CSU 
government and the opposition parties as well as lack of initiative to work towards 
compromises that had practically gridlocked any reform of the citizenship law. While 
the CDU/CSU in the government had again been experiencing internal disagreements, 
the SPD and the Greens on the other side started growing closer – the first more liberal 
and the second less radical. This also included developing similar positions on 
immigration and integration related topics such as supporting shorter waiting times for 
naturalization processes, dual citizenships and the introduction of ius soli (Green 2004, 
94-95).  
 
The new SPD-Green government presented itself as bringing paradigmatic shift and was 
widely expected to implement fast change to various policy areas, including citizenship 
legislation. It however turned out to be also, a government of major struggles that even 
included elements of populist politics, between the government and the conservative 
CDU/CSU, that now led the opposition, over migration policies. As Howard (2008, 50) 
notes, this was largely caused by the fact that the confident new government brought the 
debate on immigration and integration to the public discussion more than it had been 
brought before. The issue had largely been kept away from the public in order to avoid 
growth of anti-immigrant sentiments that would give rise to radical right political 
forces. Even though opinions on policies varied between parties, maintaining a stable 
political system was a goal that all parties shared. This was however shaken up by the 
SPD-Green government’s public confidence in successful and fast change as well as 
CDU/CSU’s change of tactic after finding itself in the opposition. As I will show later 
on, the CDU/CSU began, on the one hand, adjusting its positions further away from the 
common paradigm “Germany is not an immigration country” (Deutschland ist kein 
Immigrationsland). This was not only caused by the electoral defeat, but also, for 
instance, pressures from outside by the industry sector that was simply lacking human 
resources and thus in support of migration. On the other hand, however, the party, 
launched some major campaigns, such as the one against dual citizenship that the 
government, especially the Greens, had been supporting. The situation was further 
complicated after 1999 by the government having majority in the Parliament 
(Bundestag), but losing it in the Bundesrat (the representational body for the federal 
Länder in Germany) after the Landtag elections in the state of Hesse. A solution for that 
was found in negotiating with the opposition FDP to regain majority, instead of the 
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CDU/CSU, which finally led to the Nationality Act (Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz) 
coming to force on January 1, 2000 (Green 2004, 102-103; Howard 2008, 52). An 
agreement for amendments to the citizenship law, which the conservative government 
had promised as a measure against xenophobic violence already after the 1994 
elections, was finally reached. 
 
As a result of the negotiations between the government under the Interior Minister Otto 
Schily of the SPD and the FDP, the general acceptance of dual citizenship was left out 
of the final agreement. However, it did include some significant changes. The residence 
requirement for naturalization was brought down from 15 years, that was agreed with 
the 1990 law, to 8 years. Simple ius soli was introduced. Named Optionsmodell (option-
model), with this law, children born on German soil whose one parent had lived in 
Germany for at least 8 years with a matching residence permit (or 3 years with an 
unlimited residence permit), would qualify for German citizenship. To avoid 
controversy, any dual citizens created through the ius soli mechanism would have to be 
changed into singe citizenship by the age of 23. (Green 2004, 102-103; Howard 2008, 
53; Hailbronner, Faharat 2015, 7) The introduction of ius soli and the thereby created 
temporary dual citizenship allowance in itself were huge steps towards multicultural 
policies of a typical immigration country. However, as we can assume, with especially 
the 8-year and residence permit requirement, this leaves out a large number of children 
still born to immigrant parents in Germany. Some say (Green 2004, 106) that the SPD-
Green’s initial plan to liberalize dual citizenship ended up being one of the biggest 
miscalculations in recent German political history costing the government a majority in 
the Bundesrat after the 1999 Hesse elections where the CDU/CSU strongly campaigned 
against dual citizenship and leading to a disappointingly modest reform for many voters. 
As a result, another kind of a stalemate situation emerged, which reduced the 
government’s options to go through with the initial plans and promises.  
 
Authors, such as Williams (2014, 59-60), call the Nationality Act of 2000 a dividing 
line in Germany’s integration politics with a shift in the meaning that naturalization was 
given in the context of national identity and integration. With the passing of the new 
legislation, the acquisition of citizenship was officially accepted as an instrument of 
achieving integration, instead of the former understanding of it being more of an end 
point and proof of integration. Table 5 shows the number of naturalizations per year 
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from 1990 to 2010, putting the so-called dividing point, where the requirements for 
acquiring citizenship were reduced from 15 to 8 years of residence, in the middle. As 
seen, a sharp increase in the number of people becoming citizens through naturalization 
did not occur. Moreover, it has been decreasing since mid-1990s.  
 
 Table 5: the number of naturalizations per year 1990-2010. (Statistisches Bundesamt 
2015:16) 
 
Therefore, I would say that the paradigm shift was clear, but more on the political level, 
and less so in real numbers. A change in government had brought about complete new 
way of officially interpreting the meanings of citizenship, naturalization and German 
national identity, which, however, had a long way to go regarding actual 
implementation and reflection in policies. The Nationality Act of 2000 was therefore a 
pioneer, of sorts, and a sign that a legislative shift was now possible, even though 
extremely complicated. In 2000 and 2001 a debate about a new law took over the 
political agenda – a full-scale immigration law (Zuwanderungsgesetz). Green (2004, 
110) sees this event as proof of a shift in elite opinion. Departing even further from the 
“Germany is not an immigration country” standpoint, this law was to introduce 
regulation for new, high-skilled labour migration as well as new formal integration 
courses for non-nationals – clearly accepting migrants in Germany as a permanent fact 
that needed to be legally dealt with. 
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A change in perception also meant not seeing immigrants as a burden any longer, but as 
an advantage instead. Especially in a situation where the problems caused by an aging 
population and shortages on the labour market became more and more clear to the 
public as well as the private sector, the industry representatives started expressing 
interest and lobbying for hiring possibilities from abroad. One of these fields was the IT 
sector to which the Schröder government responded with introducing the so-called 
“Green Card” programme that allowed hiring IT-specialists from outside the European 
Union. It was policies like this one, that brought about a wider shift also among the 
public in how they perceived immigration. The CDU/CSU, in light of the already high 
unemployment rates in the country, created the infamous slogan “Kinder statt Inder” 
(Children instead of Indians), to express their opposition to the policy. However, when 
opposing to the dual citizenship issue had helped the conservatives to mobilize voters 
for the 1999 Hesse elections, opposing to the foreign recruitment didn’t work out the 
same way for the 2000 North-Rhine Westphalia elections (Ibid., 113). This failure to 
mobilize voters behind the opposition was not, however, the only struggle that the 
CDU/CSU was going through. Internal struggles as well as the party financing scandal 
that was uncovered in 1999 were signs of much needed change in the party itself.   
 
Meanwhile, in spring 2000, Angela Merkel emerged from her party’s financing scandal 
as the new party leader steering the CDU into slightly more liberal waters regarding 
issues of immigration, integration and citizenship and the government could thus go 
ahead with its high-skilled labor immigration policies (Ibid., 115). Even the fact that she 
fully embraced that Germany is a country of immigration is a big step forward from 
CDU/CSU’s previous positions. By publicly saying that Germany is a country of 
immigration, she officially distances herself from CDU’s decades-lasting approach 
towards the one supported by, for example, the Greens – the most liberal party in 
German politics regarding immigration and integration (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
2015). Not all conservatives have lined up behind the new course, however, and Merkel 
was faced with considerable opposition in her own party by those who did not agree in 
the liberal shift from early on.  
 
In light of these events, the Minister of Interior Otto Schily began promoting a reform 
of legislation concerning immigrants and foreigners. An independent immigration 
commission, including representatives from among politicians, churches, industries, 
27 
 
unions and experts, was established for developing this proposal. Their report on 2001, 
suggesting a similar point-system to Canada and establishing a Federal Office for 
Immigration and Integration, was welcomed by the SPD-Green government as well as 
the FDP, but not the CDU/CSU. Schily’s commission, led by Rita Süssmuth, who was 
also one of the more liberal politicians within the CDU, was not however the only 
commission established. Another notable one was the one set up by the CDU. Whereas 
the latter remained on a much more restrictive position regarding immigration, both 
commissions agreed on promoting language training (Ibid., 121-122). In an effort to 
gain support from the majority-holding opposition powers in the Bundesrat, several 
concessions were made by the time minister Schily proposed a new Immigration Act, 
which was finally passed in 2004 and came into force January 1, 2005 (Borkert, 
Bosswick 2011, 102-103). The process towards passing the bill turned out to be another 
long road in German politics, resembling the adoption of the Aliens Act 
(Ausländergesetz) of 1990, discussed earlier. The biggest hurdle was again gaining the 
necessary majority in the Bundesrat. To illustrate the complicatedness of it – in 2002, 
the bill came very close to being accepted, but was then challenged by several CDU-led 
Länder and struck down in the Constitutional Court of Germany due to the state of 
Brandenburg’s representatives having voted differently in the Bundesrat, which is 
against the law in Germany (Green 2004, 126-127). This was, however, a difficult time 
for the topics of immigration and integration globally, which also reflected in Germany. 
The 9/11 and Madrid train bombing terrorist attacks were the biggest events to cause 
wider political as well as public discourse level polarization.   
 
The new Immigration Act that was initially supposed to quickly follow the new 
Nationality Act, but ended up coming to force four years later, constituted a legislative 
turning point in itself as well. For the first time in Germany, a legislative act not only 
combined regulations for immigration and integration, but also had a government body 
– the Federal Agency of Migration and Refugees – to oversee its implementation 
(Williams 2014, 61). The new law simplified the residence-status system, leaving only 
two types: limited and permanent residence permits. Integration measures were included 
in the law as a major feature and the requirements for naturalization were actually 
increased (Ibid.). Emphasis was put on proving sufficient German language skills, 
especially as a new feature for the family members of ethnic German immigrants, 
wishing to reunite. As a special feature, the successful completion of a so-called 
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integration course that included German history and politics lessons, was rewarded with 
reducing the required residency from 8 to 7 years (Hailbronner, Farahat 2015, 8). As for 
persons applying for residence permits, the eligible immigrants are entitled to the 
integration courses, whereas under certain conditions, participation in those courses is 
mandatory for residents – for instance when they are receiving welfare payments or if 
they are classified as “in special need for integration”. Refusing these provisions may 
cause sanctions. These courses were mainly aimed at teaching German language skills, 
but simultaneously promoting the “historical, cultural and legal orientation” of German 
society (Borkert, Bosswick 2011, 106). Therefore, even though the Nationality Act and 
the Immigration Act were seen as turning points in Germany’s politics regarding 
immigration and integration, a major shift on an actual policy level was much less to be 
seen as it was on the general discourse level among the SPD-Green government. 
However, a change had definitely taken place. Firstly, in the sense that the official 
politics was no longer denying Germany’s status of an immigration country. Instead, it 
was now officially not only acknowledged as a fact – moreover, the country had come 
to accepting the realities of a large migrant community as well as the need for 
immigration in order to balance the negative trends in demographics alongside with 
shortages on the labor market that needed urgent attention and caused pressure on the 
political actors from the private sector. Secondly, the legal changes achieved under 
Schröder started to change the meaning of citizenship, which has become increasingly 
less of a proof of ethnic belonging and descent as it had been all through the previous 
decades, and more of a symbol of common values and belonging.  
 
Towards greater migrant participation and multiculturalism? 
 
On September 18, 2005, early federal elections took place after a failed motion of 
confidence against chancellor Schröder, which was organized after the SPD’s loss in the 
state of North-Rhine Westphalia, that gave the CDU/CSU and FDP a working majority 
in the Bundestag. In a stalemate situation after the federal elections where the 
CDU/CSU won only 1% more votes than the SPD (35,2% and 34,2%), neither the 
CDU/CSU-FDP or the SPD-Green groups had gained enough votes to form a majority 
government. As a result, a Grand Coalition was formed with the CDU/CSU-SPD 
government under the leadership of Angela Merkel (CDU).  
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Following the legislature passing of the SPD-Green government, a new era, of sorts, 
started under Merkel. With Merkel being a more liberal leader of the party and with the 
SPD still sharing a seat in the government, the picture differed a lot from the pre-SPD-
Green government times of the CDU/CSU being in power. If the period before the 
CDU/CSU’s return to the government was largely characterized by introducing new 
laws, the focus was now more on pro-active measures as the larger legal changes were 
mostly achieved and the emphasis shifted to implementation and thus continuing what 
had been started under Schröder. In fact, the extent to which the first Merkel 
government adopted policies and measures has led some authors, such as Mushaben 
(2011, 376-377), to view the grand coalition as having achieved more in terms of rights 
and opportunities for migrants in Germany than any other post-war government before.  
 
Several minority representation and dialogue programs started under Merkel’s 
government – an activity encouraged by the European Union since 2005 (Musch 2012, 
74). In 2006, shortly after Berlin’s first Integrationsgipfel (Integration Summit) the first 
one of this kind was held on a national level as well. Due to the fragmentation of 
responsibilities in the German political system and with the aim of promoting stronger 
cooperation and shared responsibility, firstly, representatives from federal, Länder and 
local level authorities were included. Secondly, from the society’s side, a wide range of 
umbrella organizations were included through a comparatively informal selection 
process – immigrant associations of various nationalities, ethnic Germans from Russia, 
the Working Group of Immigrant Associations in Germany, bi-national associations, 
individuals with migrant background from various fields (journalism, business, law, 
education, health, art), churches (Catholic, Protestant, Russian and Greek Orthodox), 
the Central Council of Jews in Germany, welfare and sports organizations, trade unions, 
business associations, several national foundations, researchers as well as media 
representatives (Ibid., 79). The second national Integrationsgipfel a year later 
introduced the National Integration Plan – another clear sign of Germany taking an 
active stance of an immigration country and dealing with immigration issues through 
engaging various state authorities, employers, ethnic associations and other integration 
stakeholders into the larger dialogue (Mushaben 2011, 383). 
 
The nature of this document can be observed from its 10 central tasks: (Die 
Bundesregierung 2007):  
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1. Improving integration courses  
2. Promoting German language acquisition from early age on 
3. Securing education, vocational training and labor market mobility 
4. Improving life conditions and opportunities for women and girls 
5. Fostering integration as a local responsibility 
6. Fostering integration through civic participation 
7. Strengthening intercultural competence in public and private sectors 
8. Advancing integration through sports 
9. Promoting pluralism and diversity through the media 
10. Opening German scholarship and research facilities to the world 
 
These objectives seem much more to be promoting plurality and cultural differences in 
the public sphere, characteristic to a more multiculturalist approach of integration. 
Integration as a term itself, received the first government-endorsed definition in 
Germany that officially described integration as a two-way process, emphasizing the 
fact that successful integration does not mean giving up one’s own cultural identity (Die 
Bundesregierung 2007, 127). As the assimilationist approach of immigrant integration 
definitely includes notion of the migrant having to give up their identity, this could be 
seen as an official step further away and towards a more multiculturalist approach on 
the state level.  
 
Another interesting phenomenon can be seen developing during the Merkel era. 
Namely, even though the federal political system of Germany has made education 
strictly a Ländersache (governed on the Länder-level), Merkel has brought it much 
more to the national level under the discussion on integration. This was mainly caused 
by the so-called PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) shocks in the 
early 2000s, when the study focused especially on immigrant students. The results 
showed some major achievement differences between ethnic German and migrant 
children. Another event pushing for more action in the field was the one that occurred in 
2006 in Berlin Rütli school. Multiple teachers resigned, stating that their pupils’ 
aggressiveness and poor German language proficiency has made teaching impossible 
(Borkert, Bosswik 2011, 120). Thus, education as a topic was also included in the 
National Integration Plan and the first progress report published in 2008, whereas seen 
as the key areas for achieving integration (Die Bundesregierung 2008, 33). Avoiding 
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segregation in schools and fostering German language learning were emphasized as 
goals that would eventually help students with migration background have equal 
chances later in life (Ibid., 63-65). Even though making migrants learn the state 
language as a state policy does not yet mean assimilation (even the most multiculturalist 
countries in the world such as Canada expect migrants to learn the state language), this 
approach does not offer any kind of support for the migrants’ mother tongue languages 
in the public sphere, in this case schools. Even though education in the mother tongue 
languages of migrants has existed in Germany even after the guest-worker programs, 
they were never a part of a multiculturalist policy (Schönwälder 2010, 159-160). Thus, 
on the federal level, education is still handled in a rather assimilationist way, even under 
Merkel and after overall shift that has taken place regarding integration.  
 
Other similar projects of fostering dialogue were launched during the period as well, 
such as, for instance, the first Migrant Youth Integration Summit in 2007, which 
gathered 80 young representatives alongside with the media and related organization 
representatives and focused on integration problems such as language and education 
questions as well (Mushaben 2011, 384) However, Merkel, being a more liberal and 
pro-active regarding immigration and integration than the former CDU/CSU politicians 
on high positions, did not enjoy a clear road ahead of herself either. Opinions about 
suitable stances varied within the party. After the first Integrationsgipfel in 2006, the 
then interior minister Schäuble gathered the Islamkonferenz (Conference on Islam) in 
the light of the Madrid bombings in 2005 and the growing concerns on terrorism among 
the public. The adequacy of Muslim representatives of this dialogue process remains a 
lot more debated, but for instance, another discussion body, the Coordinating Council of 
Muslims in Germany, grew out of Schäuble’s conference (Ibid., 385-386). The 
conference, however, only took place annually for three years.  
 
As we can see, the first Grand Coalition between 2005 and 2009 made some major 
efforts in order to develop official dialogue with minority representatives in the country. 
The year 2009 saw another federal election and, as a result, also a change in the 
government coalition. The Grand Coalition was dissolved and replaced with a 
CDU/CSU-FDP alliance, which meant that the more liberal SPD was back in the 
opposition.  The strongest of the dialogue bodies – the Integrationsgipfel – has been 
continuing until the writing of this thesis (2016) and seems to have established a place 
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in German politics regarding the topic. However, in 2010, the arguably most quoted 
remark was made by Merkel at the Junge Union (the CDU youth) conference stating 
that the multicultural approach has utterly failed (Der Spiegel 2010b). Emphasizing that 
not only should migrants be supported (fördern), but they should also be expected to 
give something in return (fordern), she claimed that the multicultural approach of living 
side by side without integrating has failed (Siebold 2010). However, Merkel’s role in 
this debate was actually a more of a compromise finding one, as other CDU/CSU 
politicians, such as the CSU leader Horst Seehofer, were making even stronger claims, 
emphasizing the German Leitkultur and strongly opposing multiculturalism (Der 
Spiegel 2010a). Merkel’s message was that the migrant culture, such as mosques in the 
German landscape, should be accepted by now – therefore, still pushing for a two-way 
understanding of integration.  
 
Thus, it can be said that the more recent years and the CDU/CSU-FDP government era 
of 2009-2013 has brought a kind of a backlash against multiculturalism in at least 
official statements of German politicians. It is important to note, that as the scale for this 
analysis is a continuum, I am not talking about a retreat from a full-scale multiculturalist 
approach, which never existed in Germany this far. But as Schönwälder (2010) argues, 
even though, on a federal level, such policies never existed in Germany, there is still 
reason to talk of a retreat from the whole idea of multiculturalism even in Germany. The 
government, but even the most liberal forces in the politics such as the Greens, are 
distancing themselves from the term. This however is taking place alongside with the 
continuing work of minority representation and dialogue fostering institutions. German 
politics under Merkel has been constantly building on the shift in approach that already 
took place during the Schröder era and was expressed through major legal changes. 
Whereas Williams (2014, 68) sees the paradigm shift in the integration summits taking 
place, Mushaben (2011, 383) argues that Merkel’s contribution was the completion of a 
shift started by the SPD-Green government. I, too, argue that the proactive Measures 
introduced by Merkel were necessary to bring change, which the Schröder era only 
started by laying a very important ground. This is also why I consider the Schröder and 
Merkel governments as one phase in the context of this thesis. Germany’s long and 
complicated history with accommodating migrants ever since the end of the Second 
World War has clearly shown that a change as fast and complete as initially expected 
from the SPD-Green government could not have possibly taken place. The biggest 
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political parties in the country have long have different understandings of how the issue 
is best dealt with. The opposition has, however, eased to some extent with firstly the 
CDU/CSU and the SPD forming a coalition together and secondly Angela Merkel 
increasingly taking up the role of a mediator between the more conservative side within 
the CDU/CSU and the more liberal forces in the politics that are now fully accepting 
Germany’s role as an immigration country and aim at rather more multiculturalist 
policy approaches to tackle the integration questions rising from that new national 
identity.  
 
The end of the CDU/CSU-FDP government and the return of the Grand Coalition in 
2013 is where the analysis of this thesis ends. As mentioned in the beginning, the 
current debate, mostly triggered by a new wave of mass-immigration of asylum seekers 
from mostly Muslim countries as well as continuing proof of integration policies not 
having achieved their goals in many countries around Germany as well, has 
tremendously changed the situation in which the debates are taking place now. Differing 
from past decades, the focus and debate is now clearly on migrants from Muslim 
countries and not much on Spätaussiedler, Jews, EU-migrants or other such groups. 
Thus, yet another new phase in this topic has been opened, which, in a way, already 
started from the Madrid bombings in 2004, but escalated in the recent years and 
especially with the Paris and Brussels terrorist attacks of 2015 and 2016, and that phase 
is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
  
34 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
When analyzing Germany’s experience with handling immigration and integration over 
the past decades, one is clear – it has been a long and rocky road of coming to 
acceptance with being a country of immigration. This has constituted reevaluating the 
whole national identity and integration policymaking, which has now been slowly 
catching up with the reality that is a community of millions of people with migration 
background living permanently in Germany.  
 
The contribution of this thesis was to, first, provide a theoretical framework for 
analyzing state approaches towards immigrant integration. Based on various authors’ 
work, a continuum with the ideal-typical ends of multiculturalist and assimilationist 
approaches was developed. Most democratic states with sizable immigrant populations 
can be placed on that continuum by analyzing their policies. Multiculturalist states 
publicly promote and foster diversity preservation through, for instance, mother-tongue 
teaching, supporting minority representation or allowing the practicing of different 
religions. Assimilationist states, in contrast, expect the migrant to give up their former 
identity, at least in the public sphere. Private life, of course, cannot be intervened by the 
state in that way. In the context of this thesis, it is important to draw a line between 
forced assimilation (which is clearly a violation of human rights) and voluntary 
assimilation. A state with an assimilationist approach towards migrants, does not make 
difference based on their ethnicity or cultural differences and see this as the best 
practice for achieving integration in the society.  
 
Secondly, this thesis focused on the case study of Germany. Even though large numbers 
of migrants were entering the country through various channels, the government 
remained on the position of not seeing Germany as an immigration country for a long 
time, even after the reunification, which had been a big reason why a notion of a strong 
national identity had been kept up, under Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The pressures 
started, however, growing and the need for addressing the issue of integration became 
more apparent as many of the immigrant guest-workers, who had been officially 
expected to return home, decided to stay and bring over their families. On the other 
hand, the profile of the German (Spät-)Aussiedler (ethnic German immigrants, who 
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gained citizenship right away due to descent) had started to change drastically, 
especially after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Thus, change was long overdue by the time 
it actually started slowly taking place in the 1990s.  
 
An actual tangible shift was started after the change of government in 1998. The new 
SPD-Green government under Gerhard Schröder introduced major legal changes by 
accepting the new Nationality Act and Immigration Act coming to force in 2000 and 
2005 respectively. Actually, these changes ended up being less than and took longer 
than expected, due to constant struggles with the opposition, as well as they did not 
initially reflect a watershed in, for instance, the number of naturalizations. Nevertheless, 
I argue that these changes constituted a paradigm shift in terms of laying the basis for 
further efforts and changing the official approach towards the issue of integration. Thus, 
I consider the era of Angela Merkel as a follow-up to the initial shift during the SPD-
Green government that completed the process by introducing more pro-active measures 
and opening up official high-level dialogue with minorities. 
 
In theoretical terms, I clearly see Germany more on the assimilationist side of the 
theoretical continuum created for this analysis. A shift towards a more multiculturalist 
approach started taking place with the legal changes done under Schröder. For that to be 
possible, the whole national identity had to change, in a way. A kind of ius soli was 
introduced. The meaning of naturalization, for the first time in Germany, changed from 
being an end goal to being a means in the process of integration. The following period 
of Merkel’s first Grand Coalition saw a more pro-active implementation of this new 
approach. In a way, the state-fostered and institutionalized dialogue, which constituted 
clear high-level minority representation and inclusion, could be seen as definite 
multiculturalist actions from the government’s side. However, if one looks at the reality 
behind these events, especially in the later years and during the CDU/CSU-FDP 
government that followed the Grand Coalition, a kind of a backlash from even the 
attempt for more multiculturalist policies towards more assimilationist integration 
efforts can be seen. Thus, by the end of this analysis and by the start of a new phase, 
Germany seems to have stagnated on the multiculturalist-assimilationist continuum, 
where, if not the introduction of more restrictive policies can be seen, definitely no 
movement towards more multiculturalism can be expected at this point either and effort 
is necessary to maintain what has been achieved.   
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Kokkuvõte 
 
Viimaste aastate sündmused on taaskord tõstatanud immigratsiooni ja integratsiooni 
temaatika nii Saksamaa poliitikas kui laiema avalikkuses seas. Selle põhjusteks on 
olnud peamiselt järjekordne suur asüülitaotlejate laine Lähis-Ida ja Aafrika sõjast 
räsitud riikidest, aga ka Euroopas üha enam nähtavale tulevad puudujäägid 
integratsioonis. Viimasele on eriti tugevalt rõhunud just hiljutised Pariisi ja Brüsseli 
terrorirünnakud, mis on poliitikud veelgi enam seniste praktikate üle järele mõtlema 
pannud.  
 
Sellel taustal, on antud bakalaureusetöö eesmärgiks anda kaks panust. Esiteks töötada 
välja teoreetiline raamistik analüüsimaks riikide erinevaid lähenemisviise immigrantide 
integratsioonile. Erinevatele autoritele tuginedes, arendasin välja kontseptuaalse 
kontiinumi kahe kahe ideaaltüüpilise lähenemise vahel – multikulturalistlik vs. 
assimileeriv. Enamikke suurema immigrantide hulgaga demokraatlikest riikidest on 
võimalik sellele skaalale paigutada. Multikulturalistliku lähenemisega riigid rõhuvad 
aktiivselt etniliste/kultuuriliste/religioossete erinevuste säilitamisele. Assimileeriva 
lähenemisega riigid eeldavad aga immigrandilt sellisest identiteedist lahtiütlemist, 
vähemalt avalikus sfääris. Eraellu, riik muidugi sekkuda ei saa, mis on oluline aspekt 
sunnitud assimileerimise (mis rikub indiviidi õigusi) ning vabatahtliku assimileerimise 
vahel. Nii multikulturalistlikud kui assimileerivad riigid näevad oma praktikat kui 
parimat viisi saavutamaks integratsiooni ühiskonnas.  
 
Teiseks keskendus töö Saksamaa vastava poliitika arenemise uurimisele. Hoolimata 
tõsiasjast, et immigrandid olid sisenenud riiki erinevate kanalite kaudu juba pikemat 
aega, jäi Helmut Kohli valitsus (1982-1998) pikalt seisukohale, et Saksamaa ei ole 
immigratsiooniriik (Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland). Seda isegi peale 
Saksamaa taasühinemist, mis oli eelnevalt olnud suureks põhjuseks tugeva rahvusliku 
identiteedi ülalhoidmiseks. Vajadus valitsuse aktiivsema tähelepanu järele kasvas aga 
pidevalt, eriti kuna esiteks, paljud külalistöölised (Gastarbeiter) otsustasid riiki jääda 
ning oma pered kaasa tuua ja teiseks, eriti peale raudse eesriide langemist, oli etnilistest 
Sakslastest immigrantide (Aussiedler/Spätaussiedler) profiil drastiliselt muutumas.  
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Muutused hakkasid lõpuks vaikselt toimuma 1990. aastatel ning eriti tuntavalt peale 
1998. aastat, kui võimule tulid SPD-Roheliste valitsus ja kantsler Gerhard Schröder. 
Aastatel 1999 ja 2004 võeti vastu olulised uued seadused vastavalt kodakondsuse ja 
immigratsiooni osas. Kuigi need seadused hõlmasid endas väiksemat muutust kui 
algselt oodati, näen ma seda siiski kui esimest osa Saksamaa poliitikas toimunud 
murrangust, kuna pandi alus laiemale paradigmamuutusele. Selle viisid nii-öelda lõpule 
Angela Merkeli all käiku võetud praktilisemad integratsioonimeetmed ning 
kõrgetasemelise dialoogi avamine poliitikute ning vähemuste vahel riigis.  
 
Tuginedes töö alguses koostatud teoreetilisele raamistikule, paigutan ma Saksamaa 
selgelt skaala assimileerivama lähenemisega riikide poolele, eriti Helmut Kohli 
valitsuse ajal. Muutus multulturalismi suunal hakkas toimuma peale valitsusevahetust 
1998. aastal. Selleks pidi aga kogu Saksa rahvuslik identiteet omal moel muutuma. 
Esimest korda Saksamaa ajaloos hakati naturalisatsiooni nägema kui integratsiooni 
saavutamise vahendit, mitte lõppeesmärki. Merkeli valitsuse aeg tõi kaasa selle uue 
lähenemise praktilisema rakendamise. Ühest küljest võib toimunud dialoogi 
institutsionaliseerimist näha kui selget sammu multikulturalismi suunas. Samas, 
viimased aastad, ning eriti Merkeli teise valitsuse (CDU/CSU-FDP) aeg on kaasa 
toonud mõningase tagasitõmbumise isegi püüdlustest multikulturalistlikema poliitikate 
poole.  
 
Antud analüüs lõppeb aastaga 2013. Seda seetõttu, et viimaste aastate sündmused on 
avanud immigratsiooni ja integratsiooni temaatikas täiesti uue faasi, mis antud töösse ei 
mahu. Fookus on tänaseks liikunud peamiselt moslemitest migrantide peale. Toimub 
seniste integratsioonipraktikate ülevaatamine ning otsitakse põhjuseid kogu maailma 
raputavatele terrorirünnakutele. Sellesse faasi sisenes Saksamaa aga minu teoreetilisel 
raamistikul stagneerununa. Kui otsest tagasipöördumist piiravamate meetmete poole ei 
toimu, siis kindlasti on peatunud on liikumine suurema multikulturalistliku poliitika 
suunas.   
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